Abstract. Efficiently computable homomorphisms allow elliptic curve point multiplication to be accelerated using the Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) method. Iijima, Matsuo, Chao and Tsujii gave such homomorphisms for a large class of elliptic curves by working over F p 2 . We extend their results and demonstrate that they can be applied to the GLV method. In general we expect our method to require about 0.75 the time of previous best methods (except for subfield curves, for which Frobenius expansions can be used). We give detailed implementation results which show that the method runs in between 0.70 and 0.83 the time of the previous best methods for elliptic curve point multiplication on general curves. This is the full version of a paper published at Eurocrypt 2009.
[n 0 ] + [n 1 ]ψ(P ) + · · · + [n m−1 ]ψ m−1 (P ) where |n i | ≈ r 1/m which can give further speedups. We call the latter approach the m-dimensional GLV method.
Gallant, Lambert and Vanstone [21] only gave examples of suitable efficiently computable endomorphisms in two cases, namely subfield curves (i.e., groups E(F q m ) where E is defined over F q ; these do not have prime or nearly prime order unless q is very small) and curves with special endomorphism structure (essentially, that the endomorphism ring has small class number). In particular, [21] proposes curves with CM discriminants D = −3 and D = −4 (equivalently, j-invariants 0 and 1728). Explicit descriptions for the cases D = −7 and D = −8 are given by Rostovtsev and Markovenko [41] .
One might wonder whether it matters in practice that only special curves can be used with the GLV method. The answer is that for efficient elliptic curve cryptography one wants to work with special primes (e.g., p = 2 255 − 19). The problem is that if one only has a small set of possible curves and a small set of desired fields then one cannot always expect a nice group order. For example, with p = 2 255 − 19 the best group order for D = −3 curves is 7 · 13 · 19 · 31 · 877 · r 1 where r 1 is a 230-bit prime, while for D = −4 curves the best group order is 2 · 5 2 · 37 2 · r 2 where r 2 is a 239-bit prime. These groups are not too bad, but we would prefer groups of prime order (or perhaps 4 times a prime).
Hence, if one is using randomly chosen prime-order elliptic curves over finite fields for cryptography (or if one wants to use special primes such as NIST primes, see Section 2.2.6 of [26] ) then the GLV method is not usually available. Indeed, it seems to have been believed that the GLV method is only applicable to very special elliptic curves (e.g., see the remarks in Section 7 of [45] ).
In fact, Iijima, Matsuo, Chao and Tsujii [29] constructed an efficiently computable homomorphism on elliptic curves E(F p 2 ) with j(E) ∈ F p arising from the Frobenius map on a twist of E. Apparently they did not realise the application of their results to the GLV method. In this paper we give a generalisation of the Iijima-Matsuo-Chao-Tsujii (IMCT) construction and analyse it in the context of the GLV method. The construction applies to all elliptic curves over F p 2 such that j(E) ∈ F p and, as noted in [29, 38, 39] , can be used with curves of prime order.
The curves considered in this paper are not completely general: the number of F q 2 -isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over F q 2 is approximately 2q
2 whereas the construction in Section 2 gives only approximately q isomorphism classes of curves. Similarly, the number of F q 2 -isogeny classes of elliptic curves over F q 2 is approximately 4q whereas the construction in Section 2 gives only approximately 2 √ q isogeny classes of curves. However, this is a major improvement over earlier papers on the GLV method which, in practice, were only applied to a finite number of F q -isomorphism classes for any given q. The basic idea is somewhat analogous to subfield curves: We take elliptic curves E with j(E) ∈ F q and consider the group E(F q m ). However a crucial difference is that E is defined over F q m , not F q . This means that it is possible to obtain curves of prime order and so there is no need to restrict attention to q being small. Our method can be used with any prime power q and any elliptic curves E over F q and always gives rise to a GLV method of dimension at least two.
We give experimental results comparing the cost of our algorithm for point multiplication [n](x, y) with previous methods for this operation (indeed, we compare with optimised implementations due to Bernstein [4] and Gaudry-Thomé [23] , which, based on ideas of Montgomery [37] , use x-coordinate-only arithmetic). The purpose of our implementation experiments is to give a good picture of the speedup obtained with the new method compared with using curves over prime fields; we stress that our implementation is not claimed to be the best possible and that one could possibly achieve further speedups from a different choice of curve coordinates or different exponentiation methods.
We find that the new method runs in between 0.70 and 0.83 the time of the previous best methods. The exact performance depends on the platform being used; our best result is for 8-bit processors. Our methods (unlike methods using Montgomery ladders, such as [4, 23] ) can also be used for signature verification. Our experimental results in Table 4 show that Schnorr signature verification runs in around 0.73 the time of the best previous methods for the same curve.
Note that our techniques can be implemented on elliptic curves given by any equation (e.g., Edwards or Jacobi-quartic form, see [7] [8] [9] ) and exploit their benefits. The original paper gave timings for Weierstrass curves using Jacobian coordinates. This full version of the paper gives timings using twisted inverted Edwards coordinates. We also generalise the method to hyperelliptic curves.
The focus in this paper is on curves over fields of large prime characteristic, since in small characteristic one might prefer to use subfield curves and Frobenius expansions. However, Hankerson, Karabina and Menezes [27] have experimented with the method in characteristic 2 and they report that the new method runs in about 0.74 to 0.77 the time of the best standard method for general curves.
We now give an outline of the paper. First we describe the homomorphism and explain how it leads to a 2-dimensional GLV method. Section 3 gives a specific key generation algorithm which may be convenient for some applications. Section 4 shows how to get a 4-dimensional GLV method for y 2 = x 3 + B over F p 2 . Section 5 discusses twists of Edwards curves and sketches how the homomorphism looks when using twisted and/or inverted Edwards coordinates. Section 6 shows how to achieve similar speedups using hyperelliptic curves. Section 7 gives some details about our implementation. The proof of the pudding is the timings in Section 8. Section 9 discusses known security threats from using the construction and explains how to avoid them.
This paper is the full version of [19] .
The Homomorphism
We consider elliptic curves defined over any field F q with identity point O E (for background on elliptic curves we refer to [3, 26, 46] ). Recall that if E is an elliptic curve over F q with q + 1 − t points then one can compute the number of points #E(F q m ) efficiently. For example, #E(
When we say that a curve or mapping is 'defined over F q k ' we mean that the coefficients of the polynomials are all in F q k . The implicit assumption throughout the paper is that when we say an object is defined over a field F q k then it is not defined over any smaller field, unless explicitly mentioned.
The following result gives the main construction. Novices can replace the words 'separable isogeny' with 'isomorphism', set d = 1 and replaceφ by φ −1 without any significant loss of functionality (in which case one essentially obtains the result of Iijima et al [29] ). Recall that if r is a prime we write r N to mean r | N but r 2 N . 
Proof. First note thatφ is an isogeny from E to E and is defined over F q k , that π is an isogeny from E to itself defined over F q , and that φ is an isogeny from E to E defined over F q k . Hence ψ is an isogeny of E to itself, and is defined over F q k (or maybe a subfield). Therefore, ψ is a group homomorphism.
Since φφ = d on E it follows that
and, by induction,
Using the previous algebra, this implies
Finally, let P ∈ E (F q m ) have order r. Since ψ(P ) ∈ E (F q k ) also has order r and r #E (
We stress that there is nothing unexpected in the above construction. Consider the case when φ is an isomorphism: Then E ∼ = E implies End(E ) ∼ = End(E). We know that End(E) contains the p-power Frobenius map and hence End(E ) contains a corresponding endomorphism. The above Theorem simply writes down this endomorphism explicitly.
The proof generalises immediately to hyperelliptic curves (see Section 6 or Kozaki, Matsuo and Shimbara [31] ).
Special Case of Quadratic Twists
We now specialise Theorem 1 to elliptic curves over F p where p > 3 and the case m = 2.
Theorem 2. Let p > 3 be a prime and let E be an elliptic curve over
and is defined over
Hence we may apply Theorem 1. This shows that ψ = φπφ −1 is a group homomorphism such that ψ(P ) = [λ]P for P ∈ E (F p 2 )[r] where λ 4 − 1 ≡ 0 (mod r). We now show that, in fact,
This completes the proof.
The above result applies to any elliptic curve over F p (with p > 3) and shows that the 2-dimensional GLV method can be applied. Note that it is possible for #E (F p 2 ) to be prime, since E is not defined over F p (for further analysis see Nogami and Morikawa [38, 39] ). One feature of this construction is that, since p is now half the size compared with using elliptic curves over prime fields, point counting is much faster than usual (this was noted in [38, 39] ). Since we are dealing with elliptic curves over F p 2 , where p is prime, Weil descent attacks are not a threat (see Section 9) .
An exercise for the reader is to show that if E is an elliptic curve over F p and if E over F p is the quadratic twist of E then the map ψ satisfies ψ(P ) = −P for all P ∈ E (F p ). The homomorphism is therefore useless for the GLV method in this case. 
Proof. Theorem 1 shows that
Subtracting the second equation from the first gives tλ
We now give some remarks about the lattice which arises in the GLV method when decomposing [n]P as [n 0 ]P + [n 1 ]ψ(P ). Recall from [21] that we consider the lattice
It is easy to prove that {(r, 0), (−λ, 1)} is a basis for L; this shows that the determinant of L is r. The GLV method uses Babai's rounding method to solve the closest vector problem (CVP), and this method requires a reduced basis.
Lemma 3. Let notation be as in Theorem 2. The vectors
Proof. By Lemma 2 we have that tλ
Multiplying by λ and using
It is easy to check that the vectors are orthogonal and thus linearly independent. The vectors both have length #E (
. Finally, simple geometry shows that the maximum distance from a lattice point is #E (
Computing the coefficients n 0 , n 1 for the GLV method is therefore particularly simple in this case (one does not need to use lattice reduction or the methods of [40, 30, 45] ). Further, one knows that |n 0 |, |n 1 
As always, an alternative to the decomposition method which can be used in some cryptographic settings is to directly choose random values n 0 , n 1 ∈ Z such that |n 0 |, |n 1 | ≤ √ r rather than choosing a random 0 ≤ n < r and then computing the corresponding (n 0 , n 1 ).
Higher Dimension Decompositions
The GLV method can be generalised to m-dimensional
(for examples with m = 4 and m = 8 see [18] ). Such a setting gives improved performance. As we have found 2-dimensional expansions using E (F p 2 ) it is natural to try to get an m-dimensional decomposition using E (F p m ).
In general, to obtain an m-dimensional decomposition it is required that ψ does not satisfy any polynomial equation on E (F p m )[r] of degree < m with small integer coefficients. Note that ψ always satisfies a quadratic polynomial equation but that the coefficients are not necessarily small modulo r.
The following result gives a partial explanation of the behaviour of ψ on E (F p m ).
Corollary 1. Let p > 3 be a prime and let E be an elliptic curve over
Proof. As in Theorem 2, we have r #E (F p 2m ) = #E (F p m )#E(F p m ) so Theorem 1 applies. Using the same method as the proof of Theorem 2 we have ψ
A problem is that the polynomial x m + 1 is not usually irreducible, and it is possible that ψ satisfies a smaller degree polynomial. For example, in the case m = 3 one sees that #E (F p 3 ) cannot be prime as it is divisible by N = #E(
Hence one only gets a 2-dimensional decomposition in the case m = 3.
Indeed, the interesting case is when m is a power of 2, in which case x m + 1 is irreducible and one can obtain an m-dimensional GLV decomposition. Indeed, Nogami and Morikawa [38, 39] already proposed exactly this key generation method (choosing E over F p and then using a quadratic twist over F p 2 c ) as a method to generate curves of prime order. Note that [38, 39] does not consider the GLV method.
Therefore, the next useful case is m = 4, giving a 4-dimensional GLV method. On the downside, this case is potentially vulnerable to Weil descent attacks (see Section 9) and so the prime p must be larger than we would ideally like.
The other way to get higher dimension decompositions is to have maps φ defined over larger fields than a quadratic extension. An example of this is given in Section 4.
Key Generation
Let p > 3 be prime. We present a key generation algorithm for the quadratic twist construction. Our algorithm is designed so that the resulting curve is given in Weierstrass form E :
, which is convenient for efficient implementation when using Jacobian coordinates (see Section 13.2.1.c of [3] or Section 3.2.2 of [26] ). The key generation algorithm can be modified to work with other models for elliptic curves and one can always choose at least one coefficient to have a special form. The modification to other models is straightforward.
We use Lemma 1, which gives a particularly simple map ψ. It should be clear that the algorithm can be used in more general cases. Our algorithm produces curves of prime order (or order 4 times a prime for the case of Edwards curves), but this can be relaxed by requiring only h < H for some bound H in line 7.
As remarked earlier, key generation is fast compared with standard ECC, since the point counting for #E(F p ) is over a field half the usual size (this is precisely the point of the papers [38, 39] ).
Using Curves with Large Automorphism Group
We have seen that one can obtain a 2-dimensional GLV method for any elliptic curve E over F p , by working with a twist E over F p 2 . However, 2-dimensional GLV methods were already known for some special curves (i.e., those with a non-trivial automorphism or endomorphism of low degree). We now show how one can get higher-dimensional expansions using elliptic curves E over F p 2 with #Aut(E) > 2. 
Choose random B ∈ F p and let E :
where r is prime and h = 1 or h = 4 8: Set B = Bu 3 ∈ F p 2 and E :
The basic principle is to use a twist φ : E → E where E is defined over F p 2 and φ is defined over F p k , and not defined over any subfield of F p k , for some even integer k > 4. Applying Theorem 1 gives a homomorphism ψ such that ψ k − 1 = 0. In practice, one has Φ k (ψ) = 0 and one can get a ϕ(k)-dimensional GLV method. If k = 8 or k = 12 then one therefore gets a 4-dimensional GLV method.
First we recall a result on twists. Let E be an elliptic curve over F q . We say that a twist φ :
Theorem 3. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over F q . There is a twist φ : E → E of degree d if and only if Aut(E) contains an element of order d.
Proof. See Section 4.1 of Hess, Smart and Vercauteren [28] .
As already mentioned, to get 4-dimensional expansions it is necessary to have an isomorphism over F p k where ϕ(k) = 4. If one wants to use elliptic curves over F p 2 it is necessary to take use twists of degree d = 4 or d = 6. Hence, the only two examples of interest are E : y 2 = x 3 + B and y 2 = x 3 + Ax. We give the details in the former case. The latter is analogous.
Let p ≡ 1 (mod 6) and let B ∈ F p . Define E :
There are six possible group orders for E(F q ); three pairs of the form (p + 1 − t, p + 1 + t). Choose u ∈ F p 12 such that u 6 ∈ F p 2 and define E :
is prime (or nearly prime). Of the six possible group orders for y 2 = x 3 + B over F p 2 three of them are never prime as they are products (p + 1 − t)(p + 1 + t) corresponding to group orders of curves defined over F p .
The isomorphism φ : E → E is given by φ(x, y) = (u 2 x, u 3 y) and is defined over F p 12 . The homomorphism
corresponding to the 12-th cyclotomic polynomial. Hence one obtains a 4-dimensional GLV method for these curves. This leads, once again, to a significant speedup of these curves compared with previous techniques. Note that −ψ 2 satisfies the characteristic equation x 2 + x + 1 and so acts as the standard automorphism (x, y) → (ζ 3 x, y) on E.
It would be interesting to consider whether the lattice arising for these examples has any special properties.
Using Edwards Curves
The GLV method using the homomorphism discussed above can be used with any model for elliptic curves. For efficient elliptic curve implementations it is natural to use Edwards (or twisted and/or inverted Edwards) curves [7] [8] [9] [10] . We give a brief summary of the details here. A twisted Edwards curve over F q is an equation of the form
The points (x, y) ∈ E(F q ) form a group with identity element (0, 1). We refer to [10] for the addition formulae for twisted Edwards curves. The inverse of a point (x, y) is (−x, y), the point (0, −1) has order 2 and if a is a square then the points (±1/ √ a, 0) have order 4. An elliptic curve E over F q is either birationally equivalent 
where u ∈ F * q is a non-square. The corresponding isomorphism φ : E → E defined over F q 2 is given by (x, y) = (x/ √ u, y); note that this does map the identity element of E to the identity element of E .
Suppose a, d ∈ F p and write π(x, y) = (x p , y p ) for the p-power Frobenius on E :
√ u ∈ F p 2 and define the twist E as in equation (1). One can show that if
. One can therefore apply Theorem 2 directly to twisted Edwards curves.
Corollary 2. Let E be an elliptic curve over F q in twisted Edwards form with q + 1 − t points such that 4 | (q + 1 − t). Let π be the q-power Frobenius map on E.
Write E for the quadratic twist of E over F q 2 and let φ : E → E be the twisting isomorphism. Let
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 2. Since φ and π are group homomorphisms it follows that ψ is too. We have E(F p 4 ) ∼ = E (F p 4 ) as groups and #E(
where E is the non-trivial quadratic twist over F p of E. Hence, r #E(F p 2 ) and so ψ(P ) ∈ P . One easily verifies that ψ has the stated form. Finally,
Since u
Hence, the above map can be used for the GLV method on elliptic curves in Edwards form. For implementation we use inverted twisted Edwards curves. If E : ax 2 + y 2 = 1 + dx 2 y 2 is a twisted Edwards curve then E is isomorphic to the inverted twisted Edwards curve (in projective coordinates)
by the map φ(X, Y, Z) = (Z/X, Z/Y ). Hence in our application we choose a, d ∈ F p , u ∈ F p 2 and have the curve (
, which is typically applied to points with Z = 1. For arithmetic on twisted inverted Edwards curves we refer to [8] .
Edwards curves with CM by D = −3 or D = −4
It would be natural to use Edwards elliptic curves with CM by D = −3 or D = −4 to get 4-dimensional decompositions, as in Section 4. For completeness we now write down these curves in Edwards form.
The case D = −4 is the "classical" Edwards curve
which appears in the work of Euler and Gauss (Edwards [17] gives the historical background and references). The automorphism ρ(x, y) = (ix, 1/y) (which fixes the identity point (0,
which has j-invariant 0. Writing the automorphism corresponding to ζ 3 is unnattractive, so we do it in stages. First we give the isomorphism φ : E → M where M :
Then we apply φ −1 (X, Y ) = (X/Y, (X − 1)/(X + 1)). To use these curves as in Section 4 one needs an isomorphism φ : E → E over F p 8 or F p 12 . Note that there is no such map for which both E and E are in twisted Edwards form. Instead, E should be chosen to be in twisted Edwards form and E in Weierstrass form. One can still compute the map ψ = φπφ −1 on the curve E in (twisted) Edwards form.
Hyperelliptic curves
Afficionados will have noticed that Theorem 1 holds (with minor modifications to the second part of property (2)) for arbitrary abelian varieties. This has been noted by Kozaki, Matsuo and Shimbara [31] , but they do not use it for the GLV method. We now present an analogue of Theorem 2 for hyperelliptic curves.
Let C : y 2 = x 2g+1 + f 2g x 2g + · · · + f 1 x + f 0 be a genus g curve over F q with a single point at infinity. Consider the Jacobian of C over F q m and take a quadratic twist C :
This map induces an isomorphism φ : Jac(C) → Jac(C ) over F q 2m which can be explicitly calculated on the Mumford representation (see [31] or Section 4.3 of [16] ). The number of group elements in the Jacobian of C over F p m is given as P (1) where P (T ) is the characteristic polynomial of the p m -power Frobenius on C (and similarly for C ). The following result is straightforward.
Lemma 4. Suppose the characteristic polynomial of the p m -power Frobenius for
C over F p m is P (T ) = T 4 + a 1 T 3 + a 2 T 2 + p m a 1 T + p 2m .
Then the characteristic polynomial of the p m -power Frobenius for the quadratic twist
Our construction gives the homomorphism ψ = φπφ −1 which satisfies both the characteristic polynomial of the p-power Frobenius map on C and the polynomial ψ m (D) + D = 0 for D ∈ Jac(C )(F q m ). Therefore, when m is a power of 2, one obtains an m-dimensional GLV method. In particular, if one works with genus 2 curves over F p 2 then one only gets a 2-dimensional GLV method, even though the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius has degree 4 for genus 2 curves.
In this case, the speedup for key generation is significant as counting the number of points on random Jacobians of cryptographic size in large characteristic is currently extremely time-consuming. The current record, due to Gaudry and Schost [25] , computes N = #Jac(C)(F p ) where p = 2 127 − 1. This is a 254-bit group order, but the largest prime divisor of N only has 169 bits and so does not provide a very high security level. The entire computation took about one month of CPU time (of course, the computation can be distributed). To generate a curve whose group order has a very large prime factor would therefore take many years of CPU time. In contrast, our new approach is quite feasible in practice.
On the other hand, Weil descent attacks are much more successful in higher genus. Indeed, as discussed in Section 9, even the case m = 2 is potentially vulnerable to Weil descent attacks. Hence one needs to increase the size of q to attain the required security level. A careful implementation is required to determine the advantages (if any) in this case.
One can also use the ideas of Section 4 with hyperelliptic curves. For example, taking C : y 2 = x 5 + 1 over F p , p ≡ 1 (mod 5) one can already obtain a 4-dimensional GLV method using the endomorphism ζ 5 (x, y) = (ζ 5 x, y) where ζ 5 ∈ F p is a root of Φ 5 (T ) = T 4 + T 3 + T 2 + T + 1. Considering now C over F p 2 and taking u ∈ F p 20 such that u 10 ∈ F p 2 one can define the isomorphism φ(x, y) = (u 2 x, u 5 y) such that
One can show that φ satisfies
Hence one gets an 8-dimensional GLV method for this curve.
Remarks on our Implementation
In this section we briefly describe the implementation we used for our experiments. As mentioned in the introduction, we do not claim that our implementation is the best possible. We believe that, for the parameters and implementation platforms considered in this paper, it gives a fair estimate of the speedup obtained by using the GLV method.
The main point of the GLV method is to replace a large point multiplication [n]P by a multiexponentiation [n 0 ]P + [n 1 ]ψ(P ). There are numerous algorithms for multiexponentiation, all built on a fundamental observation by Straus, and much has been written on the topic. One approach is to use 'interleaving'; this idea seems to have been independently discovered in [21] and [33] . 4 We refer to Section 3.3.3 of [26] for details. Other approaches to multiexponentiation are the joint sparse form (see Solinas [48] ) and its higherdimensional analogues and the Euclidean Montgomery ladder.
Two fundamental ideas used to speed up the computation of [n]P on elliptic curves are the use of signed binary expansions (for example, non-adjacent forms, see Definition 3.28 [26] or Definition 9.13 of [3] ) and sliding window methods. A very efficient method (as it only uses a few word operations) to compute the NAF of an integer n is to compute 3n (using standard integer multiplication), then form the signed expansion (3n) − n and discard the least significant bit. The natural extension of non-adjacent forms to windows is called width-w NAFs (see Section IV.2.5 of [11] , Definition 3.32 of [26] or Definition 9.19 of [3] ). The average density (i.e., proportion of non-zero coefficients) of a width-w-NAF is 1/(w + 1) and the precomputation requires 2 w−2 elliptic curve operations. Instead of using width-w NAFs one can use sliding windows over NAF expansions (see Section IV.2.4 of [11] or Algorithm 3.38 on page 101 of [26] ). This is convenient since it is slightly cheaper to compute a NAF than a width-w NAF. One precomputes ≈ 2 w /3 points and the average density (i.e., proportion of non-zero coefficients in the expansion) is 1/(w + ν(w)) where
(see page 68 of [11] ). We stress, for the non-experts, that sliding windows over NAFs are not the same as width-w NAFs.
More generally, one can use signed fractional windows [34, 35] . The basic idea is to choose an integer W and to precompute only the W points {P, [3] [42] . Theorem 1 of [42] is that the density of expansions produced by the fractional window method is 1/(w + 2 + W/2 w ) where w = log 2 (W ) . Theorem 4 of [42] shows that sliding windows over NAFs is equivalent to signed fractional sliding windows for some choice of W .
Finally, one can consider fractional sliding windows over NAFs and this is what we use in our implementation. This does not seem to have been considered in the literature but it seems to give the same density as signed fractional sliding windows. It is an open problem to theoretically determine the density in this case.
In fact, for our main example (working with p = 2 127 − 1) the choice W = 11 for the fractional sliding window size (i.e., precomputing {P, [3] P, . . . , [21] P }) was as at least as good as any other. Since 21 = (10101) 2 is the largest 5-bit integer in non-adjacent form, for our experiments the "fractional" window turns out to be an integral 5-bit window over NAF expansions. Note that the points {ψ(P ), [3] ψ(P ), . . . , [21] ψ(P )} can be obtained on the fly at little cost.
The multiexponentiation algorithm used for our experiments is therefore very similar to Algorithm 3.51 of [26] , which uses interleaving over width-w NAFs (the authors of [26] tell us that there is a typo in line 2 of Algorithm 3.5.1: one should replace "3.30" with "3.35").
As usual, we work with projective representations, either Jacobian coordinates for curves in Weierstrass form, or inverted Edwards coordinates. In the former case one definitely prefers to use mixed additions in the main loop as they are much faster. However this requires that any precomputed values must be "normalized", that is converted to affine form, before entering the loop. This conversion, if done naively for each precomputed point, would require expensive field inversions so care must be taken to minimize the impact of (or otherwise seek to avoid) this normalization step. There are a number of ways to achieve this, requiring only one inversion, for example the precomputation strategy of Dahmen, Okeya and Schepers (DOS) [15] (as recommended in [9] ) or the method of Longa and Miri [32] . For the case of inverted Edwards coordinates the difference between a full addition and a mixed addition is much smaller, and so we find that even one inversion is not worth it, and precomputations are carried out directly in projective coordinates.
Experimental Results
We now give some timing comparisons for the computation of [n]P (and also signature verification) on elliptic curves at the 128-bit security level. Our timings are for the case of quadratic twists as presented in Section 2.1.
The Example Curve
It is natural to use the Mersenne prime p = 2 127 − 1, which is also used in Bernstein's surface1271 genus 2 implementation [6] 5 . This prime supports a very fast modular reduction algorithm. Since p ≡ 3 (mod 4) we represent F p 2 as F p (i) where i = √ −1. Note that since p = 5 mod 8 the previously described key generation process is not applicable here. However it can easily be modified to handle this case as well. We consider the inverted Edwards curve
5 Note that the Pollard rho algorithm using equivalence classes in this case requires approximately 2 125 group operations, the same as for Bernstein's Curve25519 or Surface1271. Whether this is precisely the same security level as AES-128 is unclear, but since Curve25519 and Surface1271 have been used for benchmarking we feel our choice is justified. 6 Fans of the "Hitchiker's guide to the galaxy" by Douglas Adams will be delighted with this curve.
over F p where p = 2 127 − 1. The quadratic twist of E(F p 2 ) is
where u = 2 + i is a non-square in F p 2 . One finds that #E (F p 2 ) = 4r where r is the 252 bit prime 7237005577332262213973186563042994240687174781720151773744092855959733682433.
The homomorphism on affine points is ψ(x, y) = (cx p , y p )
for an easily computed constant c.
Comparison Curve
For comparison purposes we consider an elliptic curve E defined over F p 2 where p 2 = 2 256 − 189 is a 256-bit pseudo-Mersenne modulus. This provides approximately the same level of security as the curve in the previous subsection. It might seem more natural to compare directly with the Curve25519 implementation. This we will do later. However the implementation of Curve25519 uses Montgomery coordinates, rather than inverted Edwards coordinates, and the goal of this section is to precisely determine the effect of moving to the GLV method and F p 2 while keeping as many other variables unchanged as possible.
We now give a comparison of elliptic curves over F p2 with our curves over F p 2 . Table 1 gives operation counts for our test implementation. The notation SSW means sliding windows of width 5 over NAF expansions, GLV+JSF means using joint sparse forms for the multiexponentiation and GLV+INT means interleaving fractional sliding windows over NAFs (as noted earlier, for our parameters it seems to be optimal to take W = 11 and so these are actually integral windows of width 5) as described in Section 7. In our implementations we averaged the cost over 10 5 point multiplications. The table includes the often neglected costs of field additions and subtractions. Note that when implementing F p 2 arithmetic, each multiplication using Karatsuba requires five F p additions or subtractions (assuming F p 2 = F p ( √ −1)), so the number of these operations increases substantially.
Clearly the superiority (or otherwise) of the method depends on the relative cost of 128-bit and 256-bit field multiplications (and additions or subtractions) on the particular platform.
To give a more accurate picture we have implemented both methods on two widely differing platforms, a 1.66GHz 64-bit Intel Core 2, and on an 8-bit 4MHz Atmel Atmega1281 chip (which is a popular choice for wireless sensor network nodes). We present the results in the following two subsections.
8-bit Processor Implementation
Our first implementation is on a small 4MHz 8-bit Atmega1281 processor. Here the base field multiplication times will dominate, so this function was written in optimal loop-unrolled assembly language. We use the MIRACL C library [43] , which includes tools for the automatic generation of such code (and which holds (F p 2 ), (127-bit p) GLV+INT 3.57 the current speed record for this particular processor [44] ), and we use the cycle accurate AVR Studio tool to measure the time for a single variable point multiplication. Table 2 show that our best method for point multiplication takes about 0.70 of the time required for the 256 bit E(F p 2 ) curve Observe that simply switching to an E(F p 2 ) curve at the same security level does not by itself give any improvement, in fact it is somewhat slower. The theoretical advantage of using Karatsuba in the latter case appears to be outweighed by the extra "fussiness" of the F p 2 implementation; and of course Karatsuba can also be applied to the F p case as well if considered appropriate. Looking at the timings, a field multiplication takes 1995 µs over F p 2 (256-bit), as against 2327 µs over F p 2 (127-bit p), although for a field squaring the situation is reversed, taking 1616 µs over F p2 as against only 1529 µs over F p 2 . Field addition and subtraction favours the F p2 case (124 µs versus 174 µs). However using the new homomorphism and applying the GLV method, our new implementation is still clearly superior.
Note that for this processor it is probably more appropriate in practice to use the JSF method for point multiplication, as it is much better suited to a small constrained enviroment, with limited space for online precomputation.
64-bit Processor Implementation
It has been observed by many researchers that software implementations over smaller prime fields, where field elements can be stored in just a few CPU registers (as will be the case here), suffer disproportionally when implemented using general purpose multi-precision libraries (for example, see Avanzi [2] ). This effect could work against us here, as we are using the general purpose MIRACL library [43] . Special purpose libraries like the mpFq library [23] which generate field-specific code, and implementations which work hard to squeeze out overheads, such as Bernstein's implementations [6] are always going to be faster. So in order to be competitive we wrote a specialised hand-crafted x86-64 assembly language module to handle the base field arithmetic, and integrated this with the MIRACL library. Given that each field element can be stored in just two 64-bit registers, this code is quite short, and did not take long to generate, optimize and test.
In the context of a 64-bit processor, while one might hope that timings would be dominated by the O(n 2 ) base field multiplication operations, for small values of n the O(n) contribution of the numerous base field additions and subtractions becomes significant, as also observed by Gaudry and Thomé [23] . Observe that on the 64-bit processor a 128-bit field element requires just n = 2 (and indeed the description as "multiprecision" should really give way to "double precision"). Therefore it is to be expected that the speed-up we can achieve in this case will be less than might have been hoped. So is our new method faster? There is really only one satisfactory way to resolve the issue -and that is to identify the fastest known E(F p 2 ) implementation on a 64-bit processor for the same level of security, and try to improve on it. We understand that the current record is that announced by Gaudry and Thomé at SPEED 2007 [23] , using an implementation of Bernstein's curve25519 [4] . This record is in the setting of an implementation of the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman method, which requires a single point multiplication to determine the shared secret key.
We point out that the clever implementation and optimizations of curve25519 are for the sole context of an efficient Diffie-Hellman implementation, whereas our system is immediately applicable to a wide range of ECC protocols. In particular the implementation of curve25519 uses Montgomery's parameterisation of an elliptic curve and is suitable for point multiplication (i.e., single scalar multiplication) but not for multiexponentiation as used in some signature schemes. One advantage of the Montgomery representation is that it provides point compression at no extra cost, whereas in our system (as with most other ECC point compression systems) the receiver usually must compute a square root to recover the point.
On the other hand we have the use of a particularly nice modulus 2 127 − 1, which brings many benefits. For example a base field square root of a quadratic residue x can be calculated as simply x 2 125 . To obtain our timings we follow Gaudry and Thomé, and utilise two different methods, one based on actual cycle counts, and a method which uses an operating system timer. There are problems with both methods [23] , so here we average the two. In practise the two methods were in close agreement, but not of sufficient accuracy to justify exact numbers -so we round to the nearest 1000 cycles. See Table 3 for our results. As can be seen, our best method takes 0.83 of the time of the Gaudry and Thomé implementation. Note that point decompression, as required by a Diffie-Hellman implementation which wishes to minimise the size of the public key, needs approximately an extra 26,000 clock cycles for our implementation.
It is interesting to observe from Table 3 that a careful implementation over a quadratic extension which does not exploit our homomorphism is substantially slower, taking 430,000 cycles. So again it seems that merely switching to a smaller field size is not by itself advantageous on a 64-bit processor, although some of the difference can be explained by the particularly clever parameterization chosen for curve25519. However by using the GLV method we are able to make up this difference, and indeed overtake the previous record (our result of 320,000 cycles is 0.83 the time of the cycle count in [23] ; skipping point compression gives 0.76 the time).
To ensure a fair comparison, we exploited the very useful eBATS project [12] (now incorporated into eBACS [13] ). Our eBAT implements a Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, and can be directly and independently compared with an implementation based on curve25519. There are two main functions for a Diffie-Hellman implementation, one which calculates the key pair, and a second which calculates the shared secret. For the key pair calculation we exploit the fact that for our method a multiplication of a fixed point can benefit from extensive off-line precomputation, and use a fixed-base comb algorithm (see Section 3.3.2 of [26] ), and so this calculation requires only 146,000 cycles. For the shared secret calculation we use the GLV+INT method, plus the cost of a point decompression.
Our latest eBAT can be downloaded from: ftp://ftp.computing.dcu.ie/pub/crypto/gls1271-3.tar Profiling the code reveals that our version (with point compression) spends 49% of its time doing base field multiplications and squarings, 15% of the time doing base field additions and subtractions and nearly 6% of the time is required for the few modular inversions. [5, 14] , but is not very competitive; it is also necessary to compute some points exactly (i.e., compute square roots) to initialise the computation.
Again we use an interleaving algorithm, using windows over a NAF expansion. Since P is now fixed, precomputation of multiples of P (and therefore of ψ(P )) can be carried out offline, and so a larger window size of 6 can be used for the multiplication of P . This requires the precomputation and storage of 42 points. For the online precomputation required on Q, we again use sliding windows of size 4 over NAF expansions. In Table 4 we compare our method with an implementation that does not use the GLV method. The notation GLV+INT means a 4-dimensional multiexponentiation as described above and the notation INT means the 2-dimensional interleaving algorithm which calculates [a]P + [b]Q directly for random a, b < r, using size 6 sliding windows over NAFs for the fixed point P , and size 5 sliding windows over NAFs for the variable point Q (one could of course use fractional windows here).
Antipa et al [1] propose a variant of ECDSA with faster signature verification (note that their method does not apply to Schnorr signatures). The basic method gives essentially the same performance as our method (they transform Finally, we mention that the methods in [36] can also be applied in our setting.
Security Implications
The homomorphism ψ of Theorem 1 (at least, in the case when φ is an isomorphism) defines equivalence classes of points in E (F p m ) of size 2m by [P ] = {±ψ i (P ) : 0 ≤ i < m}. By the methods of GallantLambert-Vanstone [20] and Wiener-Zuccherato [49] one can perform the Pollard rho algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem on these equivalence classes. This speeds up the solution of the discrete logarithm problem by a factor of √ m compared with general curves. Hence one bit should be added to the key length to compensate for this attack. A more serious threat comes from the Weil descent philosophy, and in particular the work of Gaudry [22] . Gaudry gives an algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in E (F p m ) requiring time O(p 2−4/(2m+1) ) group operations (with bad constants) which, in principle, beats the Pollard methods for m ≥ 3. This has been improved by Gaudry, Thomé, Thériault and Diem [24] to O(p 2−2/(dm) ) group operations. The proposal for elliptic curves in the case m = 2 is immune to Gaudry's Weil descent attack.
Gaudry's method also applies to abelian varieties: if A is an abelian variety of dimension d over F p m then the algorithm has complexity O(p 2−4/(2dm+1) ) (or O(p 2−2/(dm) ) using [24] ) group operations. Hence, for Jacobians of genus 2 curves over F p 2 one has an algorithm running in time O(p 1.5 ), rather than the Pollard complexity of O(p 2 ). Gaudry's method is exponential time and so one can secure against it by increasing the field size. For example, to achieve 128-bit security level with genus 2 curves over F p 2 or elliptic curves over F p 4 one should take p to be approximately 85 bits rather than the desired 64 bits (this is a very conservative choice; Gaudry's algorithm requries expensive computations such as Gröbner bases and so one can probably safely work with primes smaller than 80 bits).
Open problems
We list some avenues for future research which arise from our work.
1. Give benchmark timings for Schnorr and/or ECDSA signature verification comparing standard methods, the methods of this paper, and the methods of Antipa et al [1] . 2. Develop fast methods to compute Babai rounding for the GLV method, especially with larger dimensional lattices. 3. Study the performance of 4-dimensional GLV expansions for curves over F p 2 with j-invariant 0 or 1728 as in Section 4. Give benchmark timings compared with previous best results. Consider the same problem in genus 2, with 8-dimensional GLV expansions for special curves as in Section 6. 4. Study the performance of 4-dimensional GLV expansions by working with elliptic curves over F p 4 , perhaps with p = 2 73 − 69 or p = 2 79 − 67. Provide benchmark timings. 5. There are two ways to compute the coefficients of a GLV/Frobenius expansion. In the GLV setting one uses Babai rounding with respect to a reduced lattice basis (the lattice reduction is a precomputation and there is no motivation to optimise it) to solve a closest vector problem (CVP) and hence decompose a given integer n. In the Frobenius expansion setting, one uses division with remainder in a polynomial quotient ring (see for example Solinas [47] ). With the CVP method one has precise control on the length of the expansion, but less control over the size of coefficients. With the polynomial division approach one has precise control over the coefficient size, but less control on the length. For expansions of "medium length" which is the better approach? Where is the crossover at which the polynomial division algorithm becomes more efficient than Babai rounding? 6. Give a theoretical analysis of the average running time for point multiplication algorithms which use fractional sliding windows over NAF expansions. Note that the result for integral sliding windows over NAFs is given as Theorem 4 of [42] . 7. Determine the effectiveness of the Gaudry/Gaudry-Thomé-Thériault-Diem algorithm for the DLP on elliptic curves over F p 4 or divisor class groups of genus 2 curves over F p 2 . Hence, deduce minimum key sizes for 128-bit security. 
